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THE ELUSIVE DEFINITION OF PROPERTY




Services are not property, at least from the perspective of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service. Simple as that rule may seem, it is at issue often
and its tax effects are many. Moreover, the fact that section 351 of the
Internal Revenue Code defines Property only by excluding services
leaves the taxpayer with no actual definition of "property."
Section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended,
provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized if property is ex-
changed solely for stock or securities of a controlled corporation.I The
nonrecognition provisions of section 351 apply solely to transfers of
property. The very purpose of the section is to encourage incorporation
by making the exchange of property for stock a tax free exchange. The
Code and the Treasury Regulations' make clear that a contribution of
services is not a transfer of property within the meaning of section 351.
Any gain or loss incurred from the receipt of stocks or securities in
exchange for such services is therefore recognized as ordinary income.
Equally important is the fact that the stock transferred for services can-
not be included in determining the control group required by section
* B.B.A. University of Oklahoma; J.D., with Honors, LL.M. in Taxation, George Washing-
ton University; Member of the firm Conner, Winters, Ballaine, Barry & McGowen, Tulsa,
Oklahoma.
I. I.R.C. § 351(a) provides:
No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transferred to a corporation by one or
more persons solely in exchange for stock or securities in such corporation and immedi-
ately after the exchange such person or persons are in control (as defined in section
368(c)) of the corporation. For purposes of this section, stock or securities issued for
services shall not be considered as issued in return for property.
Section 368(c) defines control as, "the ownership of stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total
combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the total
number of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation." I.R.C. § 368(c).
2. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(1)(i), (a)(2) Ex. (3); T.D. 6152 (1955), 1955-2 C.B. 61, 169.
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351.3
"Property" is defined in section 351 of the Code only by the nega-
tive implication arising from the exclusion of services. This apparently
innocent distinction between property and services takes on great mag-
nitude because of the tax effect which results from the e.xchange of
stock or securities for services. Because one who receives stock in ex-
change for services would not be a transferor of property, the stock he
receives cannot be used to determine whether the eighty percent control
test is satisfied.4 If more than twenty percent of the stock is issued for
services, the nonrecognition treatment of section 351 is foregone.5 Be-
cause the applicability of section 351 may turn on what percentage of
stock was transferred for property and what percentage was transferred
for services, the definition of property and the delineation of the cate-
gories of property and services are all important. The dividing line be-
tween these two categories is unclear.
In his classic article,6 Professor Herwitz raised the classification
problem as it pertains to promoters' or organizers' stock; but classifica-
tion problems are more widespread today. This article, through an ex-
amination of the case law and rulings which have attempted to define
and explain the concept of section 351 property, will determine the cur-
rent posture of the Internal Revenue Service and the courts, and will-
make several potentially helpful suggestions.
II. RELATIONSHIP OF PROPERTY UNDER SECTION 351 TO SECTION
1221 OF THE CODE
In examining the treatment of property under section 351, it is nec-
3. For purposes of section 351, the "control group" is defined in section 368(c) to mean the
ownership of at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled
to vote, and at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the
corporation.
4. See I.R.C. §§ 351(a), 368(c). Besides the nonavailability of the stock in computing the all
important control test of section 368(c), the recipient of the stock must recognize any gain or loss
on the exchange. The transferor of the non-includable "property" thereby loses the benefits of the
§ 351 transaction even if the control test is otherwise satisfied.
5. However, an exchange does not automatically fail to satisfy section 351 merely because
the corporation issues a part of its stock or securities for services. Rather the effect of the statute is
that stock received by a transferor for services where the transferor also contributed property can
be included in determining the satisfaction of the 80 percent control test. B. BIrKER & J. Eus-
TICE, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, § 3.03 at 3-10, 3-11
(4th ed. 1979). However, the transfer of a nominal amount of property along with the services for
the purpose of qualifying under § 351 will be ignored. Kamborian v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 847,
862-64 (1971); Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(1).
6. Herwitz, Allocation ofStock Between Services and Capital in the Organization ofa Close
Corporation, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1098 (1962).
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essary to recognize that the word "property" appears in more than one
section of the Code.7 The cases attempting to define property within
these other sections may aid the taxpayer in interpreting section 351,
especially when the varying purposes of these sections are considered.
The predecessor s to section 351 was drafted with a broad purpose in
mind: to permit and encourage the transfer of property to capitalize a
newly formed or reorganized corporation.9 This was necessary inas-
much as the incentive to incorporate lies in the ability to avoid the
recognition of gain or loss in the change of business form, a penalty
that otherwise accompanies such a change. Other Code sections re-
quiring an interpretation of the term property have different purposes.
For example, section 122110 has a narrower statutory purpose. It ex-
cludes certain types of property from being considered capital assets,
7. See Regenstein v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 183, 189 (1960) (citing a line of cases constru-
ing "property" under I.R.C. § 1221 and deciding capital gains treatment thereunder).
8. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(b)(5), 53 Stat. 37 (now I.R.C. § 351(a)).
9. S. Rep. No. 275, 67th Cong. 1st sess. (1921).
10. I.R.C. § 1221 reads as follows:
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "capital asset" means property held by the
taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does not include-
(I) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would
properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the
taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of his trade or business;
(2) property, used in his trade or business, of a character which is subject to
the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167, or real property used in his trade
or business;
(3) a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, a letter or memo-
randum, or similar property, held by-
(A) a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property,
(B) in the case of a letter, memorandum, or similar property, a taxpayer
for whom such property was prepared or produced, or
(C) A taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such proprety is determined,
for purposes of determining gain from a sale or exchange in whole or part by refer-
ence to the basis of such property in the hands of a taxpayer described in subpara-
graph (A) or (B);
(4) accounts or notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course of trade or
business for services or from the sale of property described in paragraph (1);
(5) an obligation of the United States or any of its possessions, or of a State or
any political subdivision thereof, or of the District of Columbia, issued on or after March
1, 1941, on a discount basis and payable without interest at a fixed maturity date not
exceeding one year from the date of issue; or
(6) a publication of the United States Government (including the Congres-
sional Record) which is received from the United States Government or any agency
thereof, other than by purchase at the price at which it is offered for sale to the public,
and which is held by-
(A) a taxpayer who so received such publication, or
(B) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such publication is deter-
mined, for purposes of determining gain from a sale or exchange, in whole or in part
by reference to the basis of such publication in the hands of a taxpayer described in
subparagraph (A).
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and thus restricts the type of property transfers that will receive capital
gains treatment. If the different statutory goals are to be given mean-
ing, the definition of property under section 351(a) should develop
more broadly than under section 1221.
III. MONEY AS PROPERTY
In sections of the Code other than 351, the term "property" does
not always include money. Originally, in interpreting section 112(b)(5)
(the predecessor of section 351(a)), the Service ruled that money was
not to be regarded as property." In Halliburton v. Commissioner,1
2
however, the Ninth Circuit overruled the Board of Tax Appeals and
determined that property included money. The cases of Claude Neon
Lights, Inc. v. Commissioner'3 and Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner,4
decided soon thereafter, also held that money constituted property.
The more recent case of Holstein v. Commissioner" and a revenue rul-
ing16 under the 1954 Code have settled the issue and money now is
clearly regarded as property under section 351(a).
IV. PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHTS, AND TECHNICAL KNOW-
How AS PROPERTY
The principles applied to the treatment of patents and patent
rights provided the first significant analysis of the meaning of property
within section 351. These principles are of continuing validity in deter-
mining the characterization of property today.
In the patent cases, the courts and the Service began to define
property in terms of legally protectable rights. 17 The protection of in-
ventions and ideas, however, is by no means always based on the con-
cept of property. Generally, only those ideas which might be patented
or copyrighted are afforded legal protection on a "property basis,"' 8
though other touchstones are utilized to protect other forms of intellec-
tual property. Regardless of the foundation for various interpretations,
11. G.C.M. 2862, VII-1 C.B. 161 (1928).
12. 78 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1935).
13. 35 B.T.A. 424 (1937), acq., 1937-2 C.B. 5.
14. 109 F.2d 479 (1st Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1939).
15. 23 T.C. 923 (1955).
16. Rev. Rul. 69-357, 1969-1 C.B. 101.
17. Kronner v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 730 (Ct. CI. 1953); Myers v. Commissioner 6 T.C.
258 (1946); Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 C.B. 133; Rev. Rul. 58-353, 1958-2 C.B. 408.
18. Sehramm, Basisfor Protection of Intellectual Property Other Than Patents, Trademarks
and Copyrights, 44 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 75 (1962).
1979]
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the tax law has followed the directions of the general law regarding
patents, trademarks, and copyrights. 9 There is little serious disagree-
ment today that those concepts which are protected under the general
law, whether they be trademark, patent, or copyright, are indeed prop-
erty under section 351(a).
When characterizing concepts other than patents, trademarks, and
copyrights, the distinction between property and services is more diffi-
cult to make. Trade secrets, secret processes, technical know-how, and
the like do not conform to the pattern established in the patent cases
because of their intangible nature. Thus, the courts and the service
have difficulty accepting these as property. Yet, it should be obvious
that these intangible items command a value upon which fortunes are
often built.2" Further, these rights may be transferred as a substantial
part of the assets of the company utilizing them.
In approaching this definitional problem, the Service has been un-
willing to abandon the principles it utilizes in characterizing patents.
Property for purposes of section 351 includes "secret processes and for-
mulas," and any other secret information pertaining to processes in the
general nature of a patentable invention, without regard to whether a
patent has been applied for or whether the information is patentable.21
Other secret information is considered under section 351(a) on a case-
by-case basis.22
This method of defining property is of questionable validity when
the realities of the business world today are considered. Such a narrow
definition eliminates many rights and intangibles which clearly have
value. Entire corporate structures are often based upon a secret which
would not qualify as property under this interpretation.
Secret processes which may not be in the nature of a patentable
invention have been included in the definition of property by the
courts.23 For example, in EZ duPont de Nemours & Co. v. United
19. Watson v. United States, 222 F.2d 689 (10th Cir. 1955).
20. One of the most obvious and classic examples of a trade secret of this nature is the
formula for Coca-Cola syrup.
21. Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 C.B. 133. It is noteworthy to mention that this position was
established by inference many years earlier in G.C.M. 21507, 1939-2 C.B. 189.
22. Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 C.B. 133, 134.
23. Huckins v. United States, No. 4323-Civil-J. (S.D. Fla. 4/1/60) (reprintedin 60-1 U.S. Tax
Cases (CCH) 1 9394 (1960)); Nelson v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1953). In these cases
the authorities defined the secret process as property within the meaning of I.R.C. section 1221
which defines the phrase "capital asset" in terms of property. Although these cases relate to prop-
erty in another section of the Code as opposed to section 351, it seems safe to assume that the
[Vol. 15:230
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States24 the court held that the "essential element" of the ownership of
a trade secret or secret process is the "right" of the inventor or the dis-
coverer "to prevent unauthorized disclosure" of the process. 25 If the
Service were to adopt the reasoning of this court, it would likely be
required to redraft its present position and thus apply this expanded
concept of property to section 351(a). In E.L duPont, the Service con-
ceded that the trade secret was property under section 117(a) (the pred-
ecessor of section 1221).26 Although such a trade secret might fail to
meet the Service's current criteria for property under section 35 1(a) (as
not being in the nature of a patentable invention), it still has great prac-
tical business value. As the court in EL duPont recognized, one value
of such a secret is the discoverer's right to transfer his knowledge and
control to another so that the transferee can make use of it without
liability to the discoverer.27 Realistically, such secrets offer a competi-
tive benefit that may be of even greater value to a corporation than
patentable articles. Unlike patents, their monopoly is not limited in
time, but is instead dependent solely on the ability of the owner of the
trade secret to prevent disclosure.
The current interpretation in Revenue Ruling 64-56 appears to be
based on the administrative convenience offered by narrow classifica-
tions rather than an appreciation of the practical business value such
transferable interests have. The Service may fear that a practical defi-
nition that qualifies the transfer of such interests as were identified in
EL duPont would open section 351 to certain abuses not present under
the restrictive interpretation provided by Revenue Ruling 64-56. Be-
cause section 351 is intended to permit and encourage the tax-free in-
corporation of ongoing businesses, however, the restrictive
interpretation is unwarranted.
V. GOODWILL AS PROPERTY
At this point in the "property-services spectrum"2 8 the concepts
definition for section 1221 purposes would, or at least should, be more narrow than for purposes of
section 351. See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.
24. 288 F.2d 904 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
25. Id. at 911.
26. Id. at 910.
27. Id. at 912-13.
28. The "property-services spectrum" is a term referred to in an effort to delineate the at-
tempts by the courts and Service to clarify the vague area between property and services. At the
extreme property end of the spectrum are buildings, land, and money. At the services end are
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under the current law begin to blur. The ideas and principles of prop-
erty classification for section 351(a) purposes migrate into an area in
which rigid definitions are clearly inapplicable.
The sale of a successful ongoing business often brings a higher
price than the assets on the balance sheet indicate the business is worth.
This difference is sometimes attributable to various indices of valua-
tion.29 Often, however, the difference in book value and price may be
attributable, at least in part, to that intangible asset termed goodwill.
Goodwill may be present in small personal service businesses or in the
largest corporations. Goodwill is considered by businessmen, account-
ants, and lawyers to be an asset for which consideration is required in
the sale of a business. It is a by-product of a well organized, profitable
business enterprise. Clearly goodwill is intangible, but it is an asset
within the full meaning of the word.30
The case law holds that goodwill may be a salable asset, depend-
ing on the facts and circumstances involved. Salable goodwill is the
reasonable expectation of a preference, for which a buyer pays a pre-
mium in the transfer of articles accompanying it, such as a physical
plant, an entire business, or rights in a trade name." The abstract con-
cept of goodwill as a quality which attracts customers to a business and
keeps them has not been recognized as transferable property, whereas
salable goodwill (that reasonable expectation of a preference that is
connected to the sale of a business or part of one) can be transferred as
property.3 2 Several court decisions have indicated that even a profes-
sional practice or any other one-man business which is dependent
solely upon the professional skill or characteristics of the owner, may
possess salable goodwill within sections 61 and 1221 of the Code.33
The effect of these decisions is important to many small professional
practices, particularly in law and medicine. Although assets such as
books and office furniture may have a minimal value, an entire practice
may command a price far above the value of those few tangible assets.
29. Examples include higher values of real property due to nothing more than inflation or to
technologically high replacement costs.
30. Compare Perssion v. Commissioner, 296 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1961) with Grace Bros. v.
Commissioner, 173 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1949).
31. Grace Bros. v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 170, 176-77 (9th Cir. 1949).
32. See id. at 175.
33. Brooks v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 1128 (1961), acq., 1962-2 C.B. 4; Horton v. Commis-
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This is because the goodwill and continued expectation of patronage by
former clients accompanies the transfer.
After encountering decisions which were contrary to the Service's
position that salable goodwill cannot exist in the transfer of a one-man
business, 34 the Commissioner issued Revenue Ruling 64-235, modify-
ing the Service's position so that it would be consistent with those deci-
sions.35 It is reasonable to assume that both the Service and the courts
will treat salable goodwill as property under section 351(a).36 If good-
will is a salable asset under section 1221, it is not illogical to consider
the asset property under section 35 1(a) in the exchange of an ongoing
business for stock. As indicated earlier,37 section 1221 definitions of
property should be even more narrow than section 351 definitions be-
cause of the different purposes of the sections. Therefore, if an asset is
deemed property under section 1221, that same asset should be prop-
erty under section 351.
Like cash, stock transferred to the owners of an ongoing business
upon incorporation is a form of payment. If the payment is of stock
having a fair market value greater than the book value of the trans-
ferred business, the excess value could be attributed to goodwill and the
stock would be exchanged for property within section 351. Under the
current Service interpretation, however, the proportionate amount of
stock value that would be attributable to goodwill could not be ex-
changed for property. Thus, the value of this amount has to be recog-
nized as gain by the transferor. Additionally, if the goodwill portion of
the total value in the exchange is sizable (as in a professional practice),
then the remaining value of the tangible items would not be sufficient
to qualify the transaction for section 351 treatment. The more flexible
interpretation argued for above would enable a concern to incorporate
and not lose the benefits of nonrecognition of gain from goodwill. The
anticipation of these consequences may discourage an ongoing business
from incorporating.
Although there is no extensive body of law on goodwill as it relates
to property under section 351, there is no reason to interpret section 351
property to exclude goodwill. The Service could be protected from po-
tential abuses of such a ruling through its ability to treat the alleged
transfer of property as a device for compensation for past or future
34. See Rev. Rul. 60-301, 1960-2 C.B. 15; Rev. Rul. 57-480, 1957-2 C.B. 47.
35. Rev. Rul. 64-235, 1964-2 C.B. 18.
36. See id. at 19.
37. See text accompanying notes 8-10, supra.
1979]
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services or an attempt to unlawfully convert ordinary income to capital
* 38gain.
VI. CONVERSION OF COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES INTO
PROPERTY
A. Past Services Are Rare y Property
Section 351 does not allow nonrecognition of gain when the stock
or securities are payment for services rendered or to be rendered. This
contributes to the difficulty in defining property under section 351.
When stock is issued as compensation for past services rendered to the
corporation, section 351 does not apply and the payment of such stock
is a taxable event.
The case of Columbia Oil and Gas Co. v. Commissioner39 illustrates
the context in which such transfers often occur. During the organiza-
tion of the corporation, one person performed underwriting services in-
volving the procurement of stock subscriptions and agreed to become
the chief executive officer of the company. Another individual pro-
vided the legal expertise necessary for the transaction. The Board of
Tax Appeals concluded that neither participant transferred property to
the corporation, and therefore, the individuals who had transferred
property in exchange for stock of the new corporation did not have the
requisite control.40
A simliar finding was made in Record Petroleum Co. v. Commis-
sioner.4' There, the Board found a disproportionate distribution of
stock to the transferors. Two members of the group of stockholders
had contributed significantly less than the other five members. In order
to induce them to lend their business expertise and knowledge to the
corporation, however, these two were given shares equal to the others.
In construing section 203(b)(4) of the Revenue Act of 1924, the Board
implicitly held that the expertise of the transferor is not property.4 2
As the facts diverge from those in Columbia Oil and RecordPetro-
leum, the decisions become less clear. The main problem lies where
38. Also in the Commissioner's arsenal are the assignment of income principles, tax benefit
rule, and his statutory authority under I.R.C. sections 446(b) and 448 to require an allocation of
income and deductions to "clearly reflect income."
39. 41 B.T.A. 38 (1940), a.'don other grounds, 118 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1941).
40. Id. at 45. The Board found the property transferred to the company solely in exchange
for stock amounted to 72.5 percent of the total ownership.
41. 32 B.T.A. 1270 (1935), acq., XIV-2 C.B. 18 (1935).
42. Id. at 1271.
[Vol. 15:230
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services may have been converted into a property interest prior to the
exchange of that interest for stock. An early example of this situation
was seen in The Roberts Co. v. Commissioner,43 a case involving a law
firm whose contingency fee was to be an interest in the assets of the
estate in question in exchange for successfully defending the claims
made against the estate. Upon incorporation of the assets of the estate,
the firm received its share of the stock of the corporation. The Tax
Court applied local law and held the contingency agreement to be an
equitable interest in the transferred property. The Court therefore de-
termined that the exchange was tax-free under the predecessor to sec-
tion 351. The value of this case may be limited, however, since it was
the government-not the law firm-that argued the firm had received
stock in exchange for property. The petitioner, one of the heirs, was
attempting to receive the property with the higher basis at the time of
transfer, rather than have the basis of the property determined by its
basis in the hands of the transferors.
At least two other cases have recognized an equitable interest as
property. In Straubel v. Commissioner,' the Board of Tax Appeals de-
termined that property under the predecessor to section 351 included
the equitable interest in a patent held by persons who had contributed
to its development. In Fahs v. Florida Machine & Foundry Co.,45 the
Fifth Circuit recognized the viability of the theory that an equitable
interest could be property within the Code, but decided that on the
facts shown, no equitable interest in the transferred property had been
earned by the taxpayer. The court suggested that on stronger facts a
transferor of an equitable interest would be a transferor of property.4 6
The major body of case law in this area, however, has not recog-
nized the transfer of unmatured rights to a property interest as a trans-
fer of property. An example of this majority position may be found in
United States v. FrazelL.47 In Frazell, a geologist agreed to perform
geological services in return for a thirteen percent share of the profits of
the venture once the investors had received a return on their own capi-
tal. The venture proved to be a success, and before the interest of the
taxpayer vested, the assets of the partnership were transformed into a
newly created corporation. The taxpayer then received thirteen percent
43. 5 T.C. 1 (1945).
44. 29 B.T.A. 516 (1933).
45. 168 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1948).
46. See id. at 959.
47. 335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1964).
19791
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of the corporate stock in exchange for his partnership interest. The dis-
trict court held that Frazell had received the stock in exchange for his
joint venture interest and therefore receipt of the stock should not be
taxed as income."a The circuit court reversed, reasoning that the value
of the stock was taxable compensation to the extent that the stock was
payment for geological services performed for the partnership. 9 In so
doing, the court identified two alternative views of these transactions,50
but stated that under either, the stock was taxable as ordinary income
to Frazell .5  Had the court relied on its first identified alternative,
under which Frazell's interest vested and became taxable to him prior
to the transfer of the partnership assets to the corporate entity, such
right should have been treated as section 351 property under the same
theory as that in The Roberts Co. The distribution of stock under this
approach would be tax-free to the recipient. The stock could then be
used for purposes of computing the eighty percent control required
under section 351.52
The theory suggested by the district court in Frazell would have
been more consistent with the purpose of section 351 and within the
reasoning of the earlier cases indicating that an equitable interest in
property is within the meaning of the section. 3 Because the purpose of
section 351 is to permit the incorporation of an ongoing business with-
out tax consequences, there is little reason to suggest that equitable
48. Frazell v. United States, 213 F. Supp. 457, 468 (W.D. Kan. 1963).
49. Two alternative views were stated but not distinguished by the court: whether the tax-
payer had received a possessory interest at termination which should be recognized as compensa-
tion for services taxable under Treas. Reg. § 1.721(b)(1); or whether the stock distributed to the
taxpayer was in substitution for the partnership interest promised in the original agreement,
thereby taxable as ordinary income. Similar situations were faced in Vestal v. United States, 498
F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1974) and McDougal v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 720 (1974), acq. 1975-1 C.B.Z.
50. United States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d 487, 490 (5th Cir. 1964). In a somewhat cursory opin-
ion, the court determined that the claim of the taxpayer against the partnership for his compensa-
tion for services rendered to the partnership was not property within the meaning of section 351.
51. The court stated:
The transactions . . . may be viewed in either of two ways: (1) If Frazell's partnership
interest became possessory immediately upon the termination of the 1951 contract, so
much of that interest received as compensation for services was taxable to him under the
rule of Treasury Regulation § 1.721(b)(1). Thereafter, the transfer of his interest...
was tax-free under section 351(a). (2) If the. . . stock was given in substitution for the
partnership interest originally contemplated, so much of that stock received in compen-
sation for services was taxable to Frazell under section 351 (a). As either view of the 1955
transactions results in ordinary income to Frazell there is no reason to split hairs and
choose between them.
Id.
52. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
53. See Fahs v. Florida Machine & Foundry Co., 168 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1948); and Straubel
v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 516 (1933).
11
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rights in a business should be treated differently than other rights in it.
If the theory of the district court was followed, provisions would be
available elsewhere in the Code for preventing any abuses of section
351. 54
Currently, however, few courts are interpreting section 351 as not
recognizing income upon the incorporation of an ongoing business
where equitable interests such as claims created by personal services
are involved.5 Although future litigants might be successful in arguing
this point, the current trend of the decisions is to the contrary.
B. Future Services Are Even More Rarely Property
Taxpayers attempting to qualify stock issued for contemplated fu-
ture services under section 35 1(a) have fared no better than those with
stock issued for equitable interests created by past services. In Kimble
Acquisition Co. v. Commissioner," an inventor transferred his invention
to a group which planned its commercial exploitation. The sale agree-
ment provided that the transferor was to develop his invention further
and utilize his best efforts in informing the transferees of any develop-
ment in related fields. The court held that this agreement contained a
contract for personal service and was more than a mere transfer of
property.57 In Mailloux v. Commissioner,58 the court held that stock
received by the taxpayers for their agreement to assist in promoting the
company and selling its stock was income, and taxable at the fair mar-
ket value of the stock upon receipt. The court saw no obstacle to treat-
ing the stock as compensation for future services, making it doubtful
that such a transfer may be held to constitute property within section
351. 59 The Tax Court reached a similar result in Washburne v. Com-
54. These include the assignment of income principles, tax benefit rules, device rules, and the
Commissioner's statutory authority to require a clear reflection of income. See note 39 supra.
55. See, e.g., Vestal v. United States, 498 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1974); McDougal v. Com-
missioner, 62 T.C. 720 (1974); United States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1964). In Frazell,
the court stated:
[v]iewing the agreement as a whole and the conduct of the parties in the light of the
usages and practices characteristic of joint ventures in the oil industry, we conclude that
the agreement of February 9, 1951, constituted a joint venture as distinguished from a
contract of employment. . . . It follows, therefore, upon termination of the joint venture
* . and the creation of the W.W.F. Oil Corporation, the transaction constituted a tax-
free exchange of "property" for stock within the meaning of section 35 1(a).
Id. at 743.
56. 9 T.C. 183 (1947), acq., 1947-2 C.B. 3.
57. Id.
58. 320 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1963).
59. See Garrett v. Campbell, 360 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1966) wherein the court discussed in-
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missioner,6 ° indicating income received for an agreement to perform
future services was compensation rather than an intangible property
interest. In Allen v. Commissioner,6 the Fourth Circuit held that stock
transferred from a corporation to an attorney principally for future le-
gal services was taxable upon receipt as compensation income.
C. And Propero, So
From these cases it is apparent that the taxpayer who attempts to
persuade a court or the Service that services are property is likely to
enjoy little success. 62 Though courts use the property or services termi-
nology, it is apparent that judges are actually looking to the original
source of the value, thereby avoiding any unnecessary entanglement
with the nonrecognition provisions. With the exception of two cases 63
recognizing that equitable interests may have been created by the ef-
forts of individuals, most courts and the Service consider substance
over form in distinguishing services from property.64
While this paper advocates a broad enough meaning of property
under section 351 to accommodate services when their substance is
property, the narrower reading has strong support. A blanket rule
treating services as equitable property interests would, for instance,
permit a group of promoters to form a partnership to which some of the
structions to the jury on whether stock in a mining company received by the taxpayer was com-
pensation for services rendered to the company or an exchange for his interest in mining property.
60. 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 577 (1968).
61. 107 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1939).
62. It should be noted, however, that in some cases the courts have found that the receipt of
the stock was a gift. This is far from a satisfactory solution because the necessary donative intent
is difficult to prove. E.g., Baltimore v. Commissioner, 17 T.C.M. (CCH) 388 (1958). But see,
Clem v. Campbell, Civ. No. 9222 (N.D. Tex. 10/1/62) (reprintedin 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) %
9785 (1962)). In any event, a finding that receipt of the stock constitutes a gift would benefit only
the recipient. There would be no exchange of property within section 351(a) and the stock could
not be used in computing the 80 percent control group.
63. Fahs v. Florida Machine & Foundry Co., 168 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1948); The Roberts Co.
v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1 (1945).
64. See e.g., Columbia Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 38 (1940), acq., 1940
C.B.Z. In Columbia, two brothers owned oil and gas properties which they wanted to incorporate.
The brothers contracted individually with another and promised to give him 475 of the 1500
shares issued to them as consideration for procuring cash subscribers for 25 percent of the stock to
be issued. Additionally, they contracted with an attorney to set up the plan of incorporation in
exchange for 75 shares. The court disregarded the form of the transaction, holding:
We do not think the transfer of the 550 shares [475 + 75] . . . can be disregarded in
deciding the issue. The transfer was not a separate and independent transaction, but was
an essential part of an integral plan. For income tax purposes this plan must be treated
as a single transaction.
Id. at 44. See also Boles v. United States, 72-2 U.S.T.C. 9493 (S.D. Ohio 1972) and Mailloux v.
Commissioner, 320 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1963).
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partners would provide services under contract. The simple failure to
pay the income to working partners would cause an equitable interest
in the partnership to accumulate for them. Upon incorporation, this
interest would be transformed into shares of stock in a tax-free ex-
change.65 Such a transaction would provide tax-free income to the re-
cipient; and because the corporation would receive property within the
meaning of section 351, the transferred stock would be included for
purposes of computing the eighty percent rule.6 6 This would be a clear
abuse of the intent of section 351 and would probably move Congress
to restrict the provisions of section 351.
VII. THE STARTING-UP--CONTINUING SERVICES DICHOTOMY
In some instances, courts analyzing services have drawn a distinc-
tion between start-up services and services of a continuing nature.
Only the former are considered property. An application of this dis-
tinction was made in Ruge v. Commissioner.67 In Ruge, the taxpayer
had transferred certain inventions to the corporation. Additionally, the
transfer agreement had provided that Ruge would supply up to sixty
days per year of consultation on the establishment of the manufactur-
ing operations and that, for further consideration, Ruge would lend the
corporation his efforts and ideas for promoting and developing the
business. 68 The court determined the consulting services to be "ancil-
lary and subsidiary to the assignments of the inventions."69 As such,
the payments for these services were consideration for the sale of the
inventions. The payment for the services rendered to promote and de-
velop the business, unlike the start-up consultation services, was held
not to be a part of the consideration for the transfer of the invention.
This payment was thus taxable as ordinary income.70
65. Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 C.B. 133.
66. Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 C.B. 133, which technically could have covered this question, left
the area practically untouched. The problem frequently occurs in situations where an invention,
patent, or technical process is transferred to a transferee not possessing enough expertise to imme-
diately utilize the asset. Often the agreement will call for the transferor to assist the transferee for
a specified period of time until the transferee is capable of operation on his own. Quaere: Should
not the same principle apply in the transfer of an ongoing business?
67. 26 T.C. 138 (1956).
68. Id. at 139.
69. Id. at 143.
70. Id See also Hessert v. Commissioner, 16 T.C.M. (P-H) 47,301 at 47-1020. In Hessert,
as in Ruge, it was necessary to distinguish those services which are ancillary and subsidiary to the
transfer of patents. The court found that because the services were of "an advisory nature not
unusually involved in the sale of a highly technical and intricate device," they were a component
of the sale. Id. at 47-1025.
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Clearly under section 351(a) an allocation 7 must be made be-
tween property72 and additional services furnished in exchange for
stock.73 Since issuance of Revenue Ruling 64-56, the earlier cases,
treating nominal services merely as a part of the sales agreement and
not subject to allocation, no longer represent the position of the Service.
Each case is to be decided on the basis of the guideline in that ruling.
Under Ruling 64-56, services that are merely ancillary and subsidiary
to the property transfer are considered starting-up services.7 4 No allo-
cation needs to be made between property and additional services
when those services are so considered. However, a separate contract
for services not clearly ancillary to the property transferred will indi-
cate that continuing services are involved and will require an allocation
between property and additional services exchanged for the stock.75
Implicit in Revenue Ruling 64-56 is a stricter interpretation of ancillary
services.
VII. IDEAS As PROPERTY
The most nebulous area to be considered in an examination of the
property or services distinction involves the tax consequences of the
transfer of an idea to a corporate enterprise in exchange for stock.
Quite often a business enterprise is profitable not because of the value
of the assets or the inherent ability of its officers and employees but
because of an idea which the business has put to commercial use.76
The idea may relate to a specific method of running a business, such as
mutual funds which invest primarily in real estate and natural re-
71. 16 T.C.M. (P-H) % 47,301 at 47-1020.
72. Id. at 1024-47 and 47-1025.
73. Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 C.B. 133.
74. The Ruling stated,
Where both property and services are furnished as consideration, and the services
are not merely ancillary and subsidiary to the property transfer, a reasonable allocation
is to be made.
Training the transferee's employees in skills of any grade through expertness, for
example, in a recognized profession, craft, or trade is to be distinguished as essentially
educational and, like any other teaching services, is taxable when compensated in stock
or otherwise, without being affected by section 351 of the Code. However, where the
transferee's employees concerned already have the particular skills in question, it will
ordinarily follow as a matter of fact that other consideration alone and not training in
those skills is being furnished for the transferor's stock.
Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 C.B. 133, 134.
75. See id. at 134-35.
76. Examples of this type of enterprise are numerous. From the idea of self-service laundries
to the one-stop grocery store concept, people have become wealthy on ideas.
[Vol. 15:230
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sources7 7 or in blue-chip securities.78 An even better example is the
idea of one mutual fund to foresake investments in cigarettes, liquor, or
pharmaceutical stocks in an effort to appeal to investors who are Chris-
tian Scientists.79
Ideas such as these are probably not protected from duplication in
the general legal sense. Frequently, however, they do have value. This
value is reflected in the willingness of investors to pay many times the
worth of the tangible aissets for an interest in a new company. They are
investing in the idea behind the business. When a business is trans-
ferred, a premium is often paid for nothing more than the successful
implementation of an idea.
To date, the Service has been unwilling to accept the value of an
idea as property within the meaning of section 351(a).80 The courts,
however, have referred to the value of that intangible interest com-
prised of ideas and experience."' Possibly of even greater importance is
the recognition by at least one court that property includes "whatever
may be transferred." ' This view of property would clearly include
ideas within the meaning of property for section 351(a) purposes.
It is doubtful from the analysis of cases in the earlier sections of
this paper that a liberal interpretation such as that suggested above'will
be forthcoming with regard to ideas. The Service and the courts will
probably treat ideas in a manner similar to the analysis found in rul-
ings and cases relating to the value of an individual's name.13
In Reid v. Commissioner," a case involving the sale of a name, the
name alone was not, by implication, an asset. The subject of the sales
contract, however, was the taxpayer's name, which had been associated
with a specific product petitioner had designed and had marketed for
77. An example is the Rowe Price New Era Fund, Inc. in Baltimore, Maryland.
78. An example is the Wellington Fund in New York.
79. Foursquare Fund, Inc., as described in A. WIESENBERGER, INVESTMENT COMPANIES 269
(1967).
80. Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 C.B. 133 (citing Regenstein v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 183
(1960)). Regenstein involved the treatment of payment for the idea and subsequent development
of a government employee insurance program as taxable as compensation rather than as a capital
asset under § 1221. However, as discussed earlier there are valid reasons for interpreting property
more broadly under section 351 than under section 1221. See text accompanying notes 8-10
supra.
81. Knowles v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 129 (1965), aI'd, 355 F.2d 931 (3rd Cir.
1966).
82. H.B. Zachry Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 73, 80 n.6 (1967).
83. Miller v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 706 (1956), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 923 (1962); Reid v.
Commissioner, 26 T.C. 622 (1956), acq., 1956-2 C.B. 8; Rev. Rul. 65-261, 1965-2 C.B. 281.
84. 26 T.C. 622 (1956), acq., 1965-2 C.B. 8.
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eight years. The transaction involved not only the sale of the name,
which had taken on the characteristics of a trade name, but also of
certain patents pertaining to the product identified with her name. The
court clearly indicated that an intangible (a name) standing alone,
would not be an asset within the meaning of section 1221.85 The court's
position is used in Revenue Ruling 65-261,16 where the Service indi-
cated that the sale of the mere right to use and exploit one's name in
connection with the manufacture, sale, and advertising of merchandise
is not the sale of property which is a capital asset.8 7 The Revenue Rul-
ing distinguished that taxpayer's situation from Reid's, stating "no pat-
ents [are] involved nor [is] any product associated with the name as a
trade name .. . 88 Furthermore, the Service limited its willingness
to permit an intangible to qualify as an asset only where the value of
the name has manifested itself in some tangible form of property inter-
est of value to the commercial world. 9
Because their essential characteristics are similar, an analogy be-
tween names and ideas would be valid in determining which ideas con-
stitute property and which do not. Both names and ideas have no value
unless they are exploited, 90 and both are intangibles. Both are legally
protected only when conceptualized in their most concrete state.91
When names and ideas take on value, the interest in them is discern-
able only as a property interest which is manifested in assets that are
entirely tangible.92
85. Id. at 633-34. Again, it is not in error to compare cases defining property under section
1221 with the requirements of section 351 because the latter's requirements are much broader.
86. Rev. Rul. 65-261, 1965-2 C.B. 281. The Ruling however, distinguished Reid.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. While not within the ambit of tax law, the cases on the right of publicity, a proprty
interest in one's name, likeness, or reputation, make clear that this interest is established, and
inheritable, upon proof of exploitation during the owner's lifetime. See Zacchine v. Scripps-How.
ard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.
N.Y. 1978). See generally Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by
the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577 (1979); Gordon, Right of Properly in Name, Likeness, Personaliy
and History, 55 Nw. U. L. REv. 553 (1960).
91. That is, with the exception of the individual-rights a person has with respect to commer-
cial use of his name, the name becomes protected only as a tradename or trademark. Similarly,
ideas are generally protected only as trade secrets and patents. Cf. the Copyright Act of 1976, 17
U.S.C. § 102(b).
92. Reid v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 622 (1956), acq., 1965-2 C.B. 8. The value of the name
was the result of its use in connection with the manufacture, sale, and advertising of any merchan-
dise or services the purchaser (of the right to use the name) chose to associate with them. Rev.
Rul. 65-261, 1965-2 C.B. 281. An idea becomes manifested in tangible assets only when that idea
is implemented in a business structure.
[Vol. 15:230
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The position of the Service on know-how, which apparently would
be akin to an idea, is set out in Revenue Ruling 64-56. 91 As discussed
above,94 the tone of this ruling equates property with a protectable in-
terest. From a reading of the cases and an examination of the trends
discussed earlier in this article, it is relatively safe to conclude that the
protectable interest concept most accurately reflects at least the result
the Service and the courts will reach in formulating a consistent pattern
of legal analysis in: cases attempting to include ideas as property within
section 351(a) of the Code.
IX. CONCLUSION
From the analysis of cases and other materials considered in this
article, several important principles can be derived and areas where the
taxpayer is on unsure footing can be identified. Most of these princi-
ples are less than absolutely clear. It is even doubtful that they will
become so within the near future. Yet, in formulating a definition of
property for tax purposes, it is apparent that the courts and the Service
have looked to our social and legal concepts of property. They require,
generally, a tangible interest, or an intangible interest which is pro-
tected by law or has its value manifested in a tangible interest.
Money is clearly considered property under section 351, as are pat-
ents, trademarks, copyrights and, in some cases, technical know-how.
However, once the interest departs from our somewhat feudal notions
of property, the courts begin to waver and the line becomes unclear.
Salable goodwill should be considered property under section 35 1,
but the authority for this interpretation is scant. Nevertheless, the anal-
ysis of section 1221 cases involving goodwill may be helpful in learning
how the courts and the Service will attempt to arrange interests within
the property-service spectrum.
Generally, attempts to convert past or future services to property
have been unsuccessful, although a minority of cases have held other-
wise. This is not to imply that the distinction between compensation
income and property is completely clear. Potentially, the concept most
important for dealing with the Service is the possibility that an equita-
ble interest resulting from prior services may be converted to stock
within the nonrecognition provisions of section 351.
In the past, cases have permitted starting-up services to be in-
93. Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 C.B. 133. See also Rev. Proc. 69-19, 1969-2 C.B. 301.
94. See notes 23-27 supra and accompanying text.
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cluded within the definition of property for section 351 purposes.
These prior decisions, however, have been clouded by the pronounce-
ments of Revenue Ruling 64-56 indicating the Service will now con-
sider these problems on a case-by-case basis.
The treatment of ideas is virtually untouched on any rational basis
by the case law, and the Service's position appears to be based on expe-
diency more than reality. The problems inherent in the classification of
ideas provide an excellent background for an examination of the con-
flicts encountered in defining property. Analogizing ideas to names
and their classification is a realistic point of departure for attempting to
classify ideas.
Although questions remain, the above analysis has illustrated
many of the problems and has suggested probable tax treatment for
those problems. The principles available from the limited number of
cases decided indicate that the courts and the Service can be expected
to look through the form and consider the substance in defining prop-
erty. It appears the doors will remain tightly shut on potential abuses
of section 351 by maintaining a strict interpretation of property.
[Vol. 15:230
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